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Intent in Fact, Insanity and Infancy:
Elusory Concepts in the Exercise of
Juvenile Court Jurisdictiont
MARTIN

A.

FREY*

"Juvenile delinquency," when employed as a technical term
rather than merely a descriptive phrase, is entirely a legislative
product. Its meaning varies from country to country and from
state to state. Delinquency in one jurisdiction may be criminality
in another, or it may be both delinquency and criminality in the
same jurisdiction, or it may be neither. In addition, some juvenile courts have been authorized by their legislatures to determine whether the juvenile should be treated as a delinquent or
as a criminal. If the decision is made that the child should be
treated as a criminal, the juvenile court would waive or transfer
the case to criminal court. Murder by a nine-year-old illustrates
the variation. Thirty-five states in the United States treat this as
delinquent conduct and bring the child to juvenile court. Nine
of these states would permit the juvenile courts to waive the case
to criminal court. Six states treat this as criminal conduct exclusively and require the case be brought to criminal court in the
first instance. Five states treat the homicide as both delinquent
and criminal conduct and give the juvenile and criminal courts
concurrent jurisdiction. The remaining four states treat the child
as neither delinquent nor criminal. Neither court would be given
jurisdiction.1
Several factors play a role in determining whether the conduct
is treated as delinquent, criminal, or neither. The first is the
presumption of criminal incapacity. At common law a child under seven was conclusively presumed incapable of possessing crbninal intent. No evidence could be received to show capacity in
fact. A child between seven and fourteen was presumed incapable of entertaining a criminal intent, but this presumption was
rebuttable by a showing to the criminal court jury that the child
was of sufficient intelligence to distinguish between right and
t
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wrong, and understood the nature and illegality of his act. This
presumption was extremely strong at the age of seven and diminished gradually until it disappeared entirely at the age of fourteen. A child over fourteen was in substantially the same position with regard to criminal responsibility as an adult. He was
presumed to be capable of criminal intention and therefore responsible, unless he could show that he was not of sufficient capacity.2 The maximum age for irrebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity established the minimum age for criminal court
jurisdiction. Over the years about one third of the states have
raised this from the common law age of seven. Several have gone
as high as sixteen. 3
The second factor is the legislative action creating juvenile
courts. This legislation carved from criminal court jurisdiction a
segment of cases dealing with the youngest defendants. The
group removed ranged in age from the minimum age for criminal
court jurisdiction to an age equivalent to the maximum age for
juvenile court jurisdiction. If the maximum age for complete
criminal incapacity was seven and the maximum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction was sixteen, the seven to sixteen-year-olds
would be removed from criminal court jurisdiction. In addition,
most states dropped the minimum juvenile court age to a level below
the former minimum criminal court age. Thus, the juvenile court
became involved with two types of juveniles: those within the
age of complete criminal incapacity and those above this age.
While many cases were brought to juvenile court alleging as
the basis of jurisdiction that the juvenile committed an act which
if committed by an adult would have been a crime, early juvenile
courts paid little attention to the elements of the crime. Guilt or
innocence was not an issue. "The problem for determination by
the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong,
but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a downward career." 4 In 1967 the United States
Supreme Court directed a change in emphasis. It stressed that
2. See 4
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prior to disposition, a finding must be made that the juvenile did
commit the specific wrong, and this finding must be preceded by
an adjudication hearing where the child has an opportunity to de-

fend himself from the formal charges made against him.5 In
1970 the high court went a step further and required that when
the delinquency was predicated on conduct that would have

been criminal had it been committed by an adult, proof of the
specific wrong must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and
not just by a preponderance of the evidence." What then needs
to be proven in juvenile court? If the case were tried in criminal court, the mens rea (the intent or mental element) and the
actus reus (the overt act) must both be present and concur to
constitute a true crime.7 One, for example, who shoots and kills
another with a rifle has not committed first degree murder if he
lacked the intent to kill at the time he pulled the trigger."

Granted

that the actus reus elements must be proven in juvenile court
(and proven beyond a reasonable doubt), must the mens rea

element also be proven?

If the mens rea element also must be

proven, could the child defeat juvenile court jurisdiction by claiming that he lacked the intent in fact, or that he lacked the ability
to form the requisite intent because of insanity, or that he lacked
the requisite intent due to age? This Article will explore the re5. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court addressed itself squarely to
the adjudication aspect of the delinquency hearing. It held that the juvenile
was denied due process of law because juvenile delinquency proceedings which
may lead to commitment in a state institution must provide (1) written notice of
the specific charge or factual allegations given to the child and his parents or
guardian sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation; (2)
notification to the child and his parents of the child's right to be represented
by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child; (3) application of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment based only on sworn
testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with
constitutional requirements.
6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see Ivan V. v. City of New York,
407 U.S. 203 (1972) (Winship held to apply retroactively).
7. See PunxaNs, supra note 2, at 834. The phrase "crime" or "true
crime" must be distinguished from "public torts" or "civil offenses." For a
discussion of the distinction, see id. at 740.
8. inhere are two components of every crime: One of these is objective, the other is subjective; one is physical, the other is psychical, one
is the actus reus, the other is the mens rea. Although two or more
offenses may have the same objective component, as in the case of
murder and manslaughter, the actus reus generally differs from crime
to crime. In murder it is homicide; in burglary it is the nocturnal
breaking into the dwelling of another; in uttering a forged instrument
it is the act of offering as good an instrument which is actually false.
In like manner the mens rea differs from crime to crime. In murder
it is malice aforethought; in burglary it is the intent to commit a felony
(and under some statutes an intent to commit any public offense); in
uttering a forged instrument it is "knowledge" that the instrument is
false plus an intent to defraud.
Id. at 743 (footnote omitted).
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lationship of these three aspects of mens rea as they affect juvenile court jurisdiction.
I.

INTENT IN FACT

The basic tenet of the juvenile courts is that the state in a delinquency proceeding acts as parens patriae and not as an adversary. The duty of the state is not to prosecute but to bring the
child and his parents or guardians before an experienced and humane judge who shall inquire into the situation and who shall,
when fully advised, do that which is best for the child's future.
The best interest of the child is always of paramount consideration. Because these courts proceed as parens patriae and not as
prosecutor and judge, the proceedings are "civil" in nature and
not "criminal." Since they are civil, the child is not being prosecuted for the "crime" even though the "crime" is the basis on
which the delinquency petition is formulated. The important element is that the child committed the anti-social act. Intent in
fact is irrelevant.0
This view is not universal. Others consider intent in fact relevant in the determination of delinquency. Juvenile delinquency
should not be determined upon the basis of the child's accidental
deed.' 0 A well-worn phrase is "[e]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.""
Each view overstates its position. Something more than the
mere commission of an anti-social act is necessary. Otherwise
a child could be declared delinquent based on a crime that technically was not committed and could be institutionalized when
there is no mental perspective that needs rehabilitation. Unfettered discretion for the declaration of delinquency and institutionalization would be in the hands of the judge. Penalty for the
commission of the anti-social act would be the order of the day.
On the other hand, something less than the highest mental element should be required. In order to fulfill the mission of the
juvenile court-rehabilitation-the child must be brought within
the juvenile court's jurisdiction so the court's remedies may be
brought to bear before it becomes too late.
The logical starting point in the search for the mental element
9. See In re L.B,, 99 N.J. Super. 589, -,
240 A.2d 709, 712-13 (muv. &
Doa. Rel. Ct. 1968); cf. In re Steenback, 34 NJ. 89, 102, 167 A.2d 397, 403
(1961). But see State v. J.M., 110 N.J. Super. 337, 265 A.2d 553 (App. Div.
1970), rev'd, 57 N.J. 442, 273 A.2d 355 (1971).
10. In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 163-64, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1966).
11. This phrase has been attributed to 0. HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAw 3
(1881), and has subsequently been cited, for example, in In re Winbum, 32

Wis. 2d 152, 164, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1966).
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for juveniles is the mental element required for conviction of
any particular crime by an adult. For various offenses the mens

rea may consist of: (1) the intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus of that offense; 12 (2) something distinctly less
than this intent;13 (3) something distinctly more than this in-

tent; 14 or (4) something other than this intent which cannot be

designated as distinctly either more or less than the intent itself. 15 While some mental element should be required in juvenile
court, the variety of mens rea would not have the same relevance
as in criminal courts. There is no need for overkill since the
juvenile court lacks an inherent conception of the more severe
penalty.' 6 The key in combining the mens rea and the actus reus
12. For the crime of making a mold in the similitude of the genuine
coins of the United States, the mental element essential to guilt is the
intent to make the mold. It is not necessary for the prosecution to
show that the mold was made for the purpose of counterfeiting United
States money, or to be sold to another who might so use it; nor can
the defendant excuse his deed by showing that no improper use was to
be made of the mold. As such an object could not be produced by
negligence, the element of criminal negligence is not involved.
PERKINS, supranote 2, at 750 (footnotes omitted).
13. Mens rea which is distinctly less than an intent to commit the actus
reus is best exemplified by those offenses which may result from criminal negligence, such as involuntary manslaughter. The actus reus of
manslaughter is homicide, and if homicide results quite unintentionally, but from criminal negligence, it is manslaughter. This is true,
moreover, even where the death is caused, not by positive action, but
by the criminal negligent omission of a legal duty.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. Larceny is a typical example of a crime in which the mens rea is
something distinctly more than an intent to do the actus reus. An intentional trespassory taking and carrying away of the chattel of another is not larceny if it is only a temporary (though wrongful) "borrowing."
Id.
15.
Mens rea which is other than an intent to commit the actus reus
and yet something which cannot be designated as distinctly either
more or less than this intent itself, finds an excellent illustration in
the crime of murder. The actus reus of murder is homicide, but the
mental element of this offense (malice aforethought) is such that in
one case an intentional killing may not be murder, whereas in another
case an unintentional homicide may constitute this crime. For example, a killing (though without legal justification or excuse) may be
intentionally caused in the sudden heat of passion engendered by
such provocation that the offense will be not murder but voluntary
manslaughter, while on the other hand the robber who kills the person he is attempting to rob is guilty of murder even if the killing was
quite accidental.
Id. at 750-51 (footnotes omitted).
16. The particular criminal offense with which an adult offender is
charged often depends upon the kind of criminal intent that can be
proved. For example, the difference between first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter is largely a matter of difference
in the kind of mens rea which can be proved. The kind of offense
with which the adult is charged governs the length and kind of
punishment which may be meted out by the courts. Since a certain
punishment is related to a certain crime, the importance of mens rea
in distinguishing between different offenses is unquestionable in the
usual criminal case. This is not true in the juvenile court. Once a
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The choice of the

crime on which to base the delinquency petition should reflect the
child's mental element at the time of the commission of the anti-

social act.
Evaluation of the mental state of the child is not new. The
competency of an infant to testify in criminal court, especially
in a sex offense case where the child was the victim, illustrates7
that when the need for evaluation arises, it has become possible.'

Pre-juvenile court decisions also illustrate that the mental state of

a juvenile can be probed.' 8 Even some juveinile courts have dis-

justification for action is shown in a juvenile proceeding, the treatment
of the youth is individualized depending upon his needs. The disposition made by the judge has no necessary relation to the offense committed except insofar as it gives an insight into the youth's problems
and the kind of treatment that might assist in his rehabilitation.
Thus, assuming the judge does not waive jurisdiction t t he criminal
courts, the distinction between murder and manslaughter becomes
much less important in the juvenile court. The difference in the mens
rea requirement in burglary and housebreaking loses its significance.
The examples could be multiplied, but there seems to be no necessity
to do so in order to make the point that this difference makes mens rea
much less important in juvenile court proceedings than in criminal
proceedings.
Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAMmIY L. 121, 137 (1965).
It would be unrealistic to state that the crime charged in a delinquency petition lacks relevancy. In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 405, 88 So. 2d 707, 711
(1956), noted that the charge may be important in determining the disposition:
[Tlhe Juvenile Court concluded that the appellant was a delinquent
in that he committed the crime charged in the petition of aggravated
battery (a conclusion which, in our opinion, was incorrect) and, as a
consequence, placed him on probation for three years. We cannot say
that the same action would have been taken by the court had appellant been charged as and adjudged a delinquent for his having committed negligent injury only, a crime of far less magnitude than aggravated battery as indicated by the penalty provided for each offense.
17. Texas illustrates the adaptation. In 1857 Texas raised the irrebuttable
presumption of criminal incapacity from seven to nine and lowered the rebuttable presumption for criminal incapacity from fourteen to thirteen. TEx.
PEN. CODE art. 36 (1857). Subsequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed a rape conviction based on the testimony of the seven-year-old victim:
[11f a person cannot be punished for perjury, who takes an oath as a
witness, such an oath is not binding, and such person cannot be a
witness in a case involving life or liberty; and a conviction based in
whole or in part upon the testimony of such a witness cannot be sustained. . . . We respectfully call the attention of the Legislature to
this condition, as it may follow in many cases, especially injuries committed on children of tender years, that the guilty party may escape
punishment, however intelligent the witness may be, and however
capable of understanding the nature and obligation of an oath, simply
because such a witness does not testify under the pains and penalties of
perjury, which is required by our Constitution.
Freasier v. State, 84 S.W. 360, 360-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904). The following
year the legislature responded by amending the infancy statute so that persons
under nine could be competent as witnesses. This was accomplished by permitting the child to testify "when it shall appear by proof that he had sufficient
discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an oath . . . ." ch. 59,
§ 1, [1905] Tex. Laws 83.
18. For a discussion of intent in fact in early Texas cases, see Binkley v.
State, 51 Tex. Crim. 54, 100 S.W. 780 (1907); Simmons v. State, 50 Tex. Crim.
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missed delinquency petitions for lack of intent in fact. In re
Glassberg'9 presents an excellent example. Glassberg, age thirteen, was adjudged a delinquent in juvenile court in that he committed aggravated battery on a fourteen-year-old girl by shooting
her in the face with a rifle. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, set aside the juvenile court judgment and dismissed the
proceedings. It defined aggravated battery as the intentional use
of force or violence on the person of another committed with a
dangerous weapon. General criminal intent was necessary to sustain the charge (specific intent was unnecessary). General criminal intent would have been present whenever there was specific
intent or when the circumstances indicated that the offender, in
the ordinary course of human experience, must have averted to
the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. To warrant a conclusion that
criminal intent was present and therefore aggravated battery was
committed, a showing that Glassberg intended to injure the girl
was not essential. It was only necessary to prove that he voluntarily committed the act which resulted in her injury. The
existence of general criminal intent could have been concluded
if proof were made that he had voluntarily pulled the trigger of the
gun to discharge it, for then he would have intentionally committed an act which under the circumstances might reasonably be
expected to result in criminal consequences-a battery on one of
the children with whom he was playing at the time. However, according to the evidence, Glassberg's pointing of the gun in the
general direction of the girl and the discharging of it with the resulting injury Were wholly accidental acts. The court concluded
that Glassberg may have been grossly negligent in his handling of
a loaded gun in the presence of other children, but this was not
the same as having the general criminal intent essential for the
crime of aggravated battery.20
527, 97 S.W. 1052 (1906); Price v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 71, 94 S.W. 901 (1906);
Allen v. State, 37 S.W. 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896); Keith v. State, 33 Tex.
Crim. 341, 26 S.W. 412 (1894); Carr v. State, 24 Tex. Ct. App. 562, 7 S.W. 328
(1888); Parker v. State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 451 (1886); Wusnig v. State,
33 Tex. 651 (1871).
19. 230 La. 396, 88 So. 2d 707 (1956).
20. See People in the Interest of J.S.C., 493 P.2d 671 (Colo. App. 1972)
(theft: trial court erred in excluding the juvenile's testimony on intent); In
the Interest of Landorf, 7 Ill. App. 3d 89, 287 N.E.2d 21 (1972) (reckless
conduct in the shooting of a companion: evidence did not support conclusion
that juvenile acted recklessly); State v. Melanson, 259 So. 2d 609 (La. App.
1972) (possession of stolen goods: no evidence that the juvenile intentionally
received or concealed the items or that they were received or concealed under
circumstances which indicated that he knew or had good reason to believe that
the items were the subject of a burglary or theft); State in the Interest of Emerson, 250 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1971) (receiving stolen goods: evidence did
not show an intention to retain possession); In the Matter of Riffin, 69 Misc.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

U1.

[Vol. 9

INSANITY

The cornerstone for juvenile court reasoning, the parens patriae
philosophy coupled with the "civil" nature of the proceedings,
applies to both insanity and intent in fact. At this point divergence occurs. Intent in fact deals with "is this a prosecution for
a crime"; insanity purports to deal with a comparison of rights.
Since juvenile court proceedings have not been considered criminal, the child has not been entitled to the rights of a criminal
defendant. By considering insanity a defense to a crime and
thus a right of a defendant in a criminal case, to provide the child
with this right would amount to arming him with a criminal
right. 21 The child, however, need not phrase his request as one
for a criminal right. Instead the claim could be made for a fundamental due process right to fair treatment. This applies to civil
as well as to criminal proceedings. Using this approach the ques2d 761, 330 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Family Ct. 1972) (evidence did not support the
conclusion that the ten-year-old boy possessed the requisite reckless intent in
assaulting the victim); In re Bogart, 45 Misc. 2d 1075, 259 N.Y.S.2d 351
(Family Ct. 1963) (evidence did not support the conclusion of negligence
while engaged in hunting that resulted in the death of another); accord, State
v. Suchy, 58 Ohio Op. 2d 376, 277 N.E.2d 459 (C.P. 1971) (use of a juvenile
to purchase or possess a hallucinogen as an aid in the apprehension and prosecution of the seller of the hallucinogen); cf. United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d
441 (4th Cir. 1968) (transportation of stolen vehicle: evidence supported conclusion that the juvenile transported the vehicle with knowledge that it was
stolen); In re C.D.H., 7 Cal. App. 3d 230, 86 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1st Dist. 1970)
(assault with a deadly weapon: evidence supported conclusion that the juvenile
intentionally shot the victim); it re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App. 3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr.
574 (4th Dist. 1969) (evidence supported conclusion that the eleven-year-old,
judged by the standards of a boy of his age, mental capacity, experience and
intelligence, was criminally negligent in handling a firearm that resulted in the
death of another); In re Bradley, 258 Cal. App. 2d 253, 65 Cal. Rptr. 570 (2d
Dist. 1968) (evidence supported the conclusion that the juvenile intentionally
acted with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible result of his conduct);
Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 188 S.E.2d 828 (1972) (armed robbery and
murder: evidence supported the conclusion that 14-year-old was acting as a
lookout); In the Matter of D.M.L., 293 A.2d 277 (D.C. App. 1972) (aiding
and abetting unauthorized use of motor vehicle: evidence was sufficient to warrant an inference that the juvenile had actual knowledge that the vehicle was
being used without the owner's consent); In re Hitzemann, 281 Minn. 275,
161 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1968) (the inference of intent to exercise dominion for
theft could be drawn from the fact that the youth was caught in the act of
walking off with the property); In the Interest of J.M., 57 N.J. 442, 273 A.2d
355 (1971), rev'g 110 N.J. Super. 337, 265 A.2d 553 (App. Div. 1970) (evidence supported the conclusion of intent to use hypodermic needle and eyedropper for subcutaneous injection of narcotic drugs); In re Taylor, 62 Misc. 2d
529, 309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Family Ct. 1970) (3d degree assault: evidence supported conclusion of intentional physical injury to a person or reckless causing
of physical injury to another person); In re Turner, 56 Misc. 2d 638, 289
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Family Ct. 1968) (murder: evidence supported conclusion that
fifteen-year-old boy intentionally caused the deaths of his mother and his maternal grandmother by shooting them with a rifle); State v. Rush, 13 N.C. App.
539, 186 S.E.2d 595 (1972) (common law robbery: evidence sufficient to
show a felonious intent on the juvenile's part permanently to deprive the victim
of his money and to convert it to his own use).
21. See In re H.C., 106 NJ. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. & Dom. Re.
Ct. 1969).
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tion becomes "does the denial of the insanity defense in juvenile
court constitute a denial of fair treatment?"
The thrust of recent decisions protecting juveniles has registered
concern that the parens patriae doctrine could result, in individual situations, in arbitrary action that lacks fundamental fairness.
The objective of these cases has not been to question the philosophy of juvenile jurisdiction nor to hamper the rehabilitative and
protective action of the court. Rather, these cases have sought
to insure that juveniles are not handled as second-class citizens
under the guise of social benevolence. The courts have rendered protection to juveniles on questions concerning whether the
offense has been committed and whether its detection and proof
have been fairly accomplished without the invasion of individual
22
rights.
Insanity concedes that an act has been committed, properly detected and properly established. Moreover, the propriety of the
methods used in detecting and proving these facts are not questioned. The defense of insanity, then, as applied in adult proceedings, reflects a social policy that offenders lacking mental capacity in law to commit a criminal act for which penal consequences-including death or life imprisonment-could otherwise
be imposed, should not be held legally, morally or socially accountable for their acts. The focus is not on the commission of
the act itself but on its penal consequences.
Does this social policy also apply in juvenile proceedings? The
penal consequences between juvenile and criminal proceedings
differ. An adjudication of delinquency is hardly the same as a
finding of guilt in a criminal proceeding. While the criminal
conviction brings into play the deterrent and punitive, as well as
the rehabilitative aspects of the criminal process, conflict exists
over whether the disposition after the delinquency adjudication
will be solely rehabilitative or rehabilitative, deterrent and punitive. If the latter, then, although the emphasis would be different, the penal consequences of the two proceedings would be similar. Similar consequences should lead to the conclusion that a
similar social policy should prevail. This in turn should be reflected in the applicability of an insanity defense to juvenile proceedings.2 3
22. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, -, 256 A.2d 322, 326-27 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1969); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
23. The parens patriae concept has been criticized as a pipe dream. While
the state is supposed to proceed as parens patriae, juvenile courts lack the
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The rehabilitation versus rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment discussion veils the true problem.

That is, would the court

be able to exercise its parens patriae power if it permits the use of
the insanity defense. If insanity prevents the court from acting, then insanity will be considered irrelevant. This is illustrated
in the situation where the court must declare the child delinquent

before it can aid the child. With this approach, the adjudicatory
phase becomes crucial to the whole juvenile process. The inquiry is and must be, "was the act committed?" To hold insan-

ity applicable as a defense to adjudication would handcuff the
court, run contrary to the basic theory of juvenile proceedings,
and not be in the best interest of the juvenile himself. Without

adjudication, the court could not exercise its parens patriae
role.2 4

This is not to suggest that an "insanity defense" has no bearing
in juvenile proceedings. It may impose a limitation on the dispositionary aspect of juvenile matters. Where insanity is not a
defense to adjudication, a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent based on an anti-social act committed while insane

should not be subjected to penal sanctions. If an adult may
avoid penal sanctions-that is, incarceration in a prison or reformatory because of mental disease--a child with the same afflicpersonnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of
the state in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to the child
charged with a law violation. The result is that he receives the worst of both
worlds. He gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the. solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
The fact that the proceedings are civil and not criminal has been criticized
as unrealistic. What may appear to the juvenile worker and judge as treatment
may look like punishment to the juvenile. Irrespective of what the procedure
is called, and no matter how benign and well intended the judge who administers the system is, the juvenile procedures, to some degree at least, smack of
crime and punishment. Also, while the primary statutory goal is the best interest of the child, that interest is conditioned by the consideration of the interest
of the public. The interest of the public is served not only by rehabilitating
juveniles when that is possible, but also by removing some juveniles from
environments where they are likely to harm their fellow citizens. Retribution,
in practice, plays a role in the function of the juvenile court since the judgments of juvenile courts do serve as deterrents to the conduct of at least a segment of our juvenile society, not because they fear rehabilitation but because
they fear incarceration and punishment. In addition the adjudication of delinquency does carry with it a social stigma and the child may be administratively transferred to an adult institution. The conclusion that may be drawn
from all of this is that the traditional concepts of crime and punishment have
not in fact been eliminated. Even with these vestiges of crime and punishment
still existing, the courts have avoided changing the juvenile court label from
civil to criminal. If the label of the juvenile court proceedings were changed
to criminal, then the entire philosophy of juvenile courts, with its avowed purpose of being an antithesis of criminal prosecution, would be rejected. As a
result the courts would have no choice but to grant the child all of the rights
available to adults in criminal cases. See In re Winbum, 32 Wis. 2d 152,
145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
24. See In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, - n.5, 256 A.2d 322, 328 n.5 (Juv.
& Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969).
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tion should not be treated more harshly because he is a juvenile. This accords with the purpose and effect of recent Supreme
Court decisions and with the social policy inherent in the original
philosophy of the juvenile court movement. It promotes and protects the juvenile's best interests, and it permits the juvenile court
to function as intended. Under this approach, juvenile authorities
are in a position to provide for the child not the worst of both
worlds, but some of the best of both worlds. From the one, "the
protection accorded adults," in that if a child is legally insane, no
penal sanctions may be imposed; at the same time, from the other
he may receive "the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children" in the exercise of the court's authority
to use any available treatment and rehabilitative facilities for a
juvenile "offender."2
Not all juvenile courts are forced to ignore insanity as a defense. The techniques available differ. Some states permit their
juvenile courts to dismiss the delinquency petition on the merits
by reason of insanity. Unlike the juvenile court that has no
power to exercise its parens patriae role without an adjudication
of delinquency, this approach permits a special adjudication. The
inquiry initially concentrates on "was the act committed?" This
is followed by the defense that it was committed when the child
was insane. The adjudication, then, is equivalent to the criminal
response of not guilty by reason of insanity. With this decision,
the court does not lose jurisdiction. Like the adult court, it may
commit the child to a mental institution. 6
A similar technique requires the filing of a delinquency petition but authorizes commitment prior to the need for adjudication on the petition. In re Winburn2 7 illustrates the application
of this approach. A petition for delinquency was filed charging
fifteen-year-old Winburn with first degree murder. At the adju25. Id. at -, 256 A.2d at 328-29.
26. See In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 874, 464 P.2d 127, 141-42, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 671, 685-86 (1970) (concurring and dissenting opinion); see also In re
Turner, 56 Misc. 2d 638, 645-46, 289 N.Y.S.2d 652, 659-60 (Family Ct.
1968); State v. Farrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). The technique
for pleading non-delinquent by reason of insanity may not be available in some
jurisdictions due to statutory drafting. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 1633 (1953), which authorizes commitment of an adult acquitted by reason of
insanity, applies only to indictable offenses and is not applicable in juvenile
cases. See In re H.C.. 106 N.J. Super. 583, - n.5, 256 A.2d 322, 328 n.5
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969).
In In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 165, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1966), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the juvenile judge had the duty to dismiss
the delinquency petition on its merits when the fact of insanity was proved.
This would make the case appear to be authority for this view of non-delinquent
by reason of insanity. It is, however, better authority for the next techniquecommitment prior to the need for adjudication.
27. 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
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dication hearing, Winburn's guardian ad litem invited the court's
attention to the fact that there was some question whether his
ward "understands the nature and quality of his acts at this
time." The juvenile judge ordered that the child undergo a psychiatric examination. 2 After the report was made, the judge ordered a hearing into the juvenile's mental condition. 29 The child
was adjudged mentally ill and ordered committed. Since the
child already had been committed, the juvenile court dismissed the
delinquency petition on its merits by reason of insanity. Since the
dismissal of the delinquency petition occurred after he was committed, this approach must be distinguished from the prior approach where commitment was derived from the type of dismissal. 30
Unlike the previous two techniques where the filing of a delinquency petition is at least the minimum requirement for initiation
of the juvenile process, a third technique is to extend juvenile
court jurisdiction beyond the delinquency concept. The juvenile
court is provided with jurisdiction to commit the insane child
without proof of delinquency. For example, in California, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to adjudge a minor to be a dependent
child of the court "[wiho is physically dangerous to the public
because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality."'" This avoids the wait for the necessary actus reus required
for the crime and makes the
aid of the court available as soon as
2
proceedings are instituted.
III.

INFANCY

The third concept, infancy, adds a new facet to the intent
problem. Unlike the lack of intent in fact and the lack of intent
due to the inability to formulate the intent in fact, infancy does
not consider ad hoe the existence of intent. The infancy defense
is based on the policy decision that all children below a given age
should be treated as if they did not have the requisite intent.
While intent in fact and insanity could be applied to all children
28. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.24 (1957).
29. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.14(3) (1957) which provides:
If a child is before the court, alleged to be a delinquent . . . and it

appears that the child may be. . .mentally ill, the court may order a
hearing to determine whether the child is. . .mentally ill ....
30. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the approaches taken in In re
II.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969) and In re
Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966), see Popkin & Lippert,
Is There a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10
J.FAMLY L. 421 (1971).
31. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600(c) (West 1972).
32. Cf. In re M.G.S., 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 337 n.3, 72 Cal. Rptr. 808,
812 n.3 (2d Dist. 1968).
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in juvenile court, the infancy defense, if applicable, might apply
differently to children of various age groups. For example, if
the jurisdiction retained the common law ages for the infancy presumptions at seven and fourteen and if its juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction from birth to age sixteen, then three categories
would exist. The child under seven could claim the common law
presumption of complete criminal incapacity and thus could not
be charged with delinquency based on any offense that would require intent. The child between seven and fourteen could claim
the common law presumption of criminal incapacity and the state
would have the burden of rebutting the presumption with proof
of capacity. The child between fourteen and sixteen would be
beyond the age of incapacity and would receive no benefit from
the infancy presumption.
The applicability of the infancy defense to juvenile court proceedings should depend on whether the purpose underlying the infancy defense is compatible with the nature of the juvenile court.
The infancy defense was conceived prior to the conception of the
juvenile court.3 3 Its purpose at common law was to prevent the
punishment by any criminal prosecution whatever of an infant under the age of discretion. 34 Assuming that the purpose of the juvenile court is rehabilitation and not punishment, the infancy defense would be incompatible with delinquency proceedings. 3" To
hold otherwise would engraft a series of exceptions to juvenile
court jurisdiction. A typical jurisdictional statute may currently
read:
The juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child under 16 who violates any
law of this state of the grade of felony.
To hold the infancy defense applicable would change the statute to
read:
The juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child over 7 and under 16 who
violates any law of this state of the grade of felony; provided
that in cases where the child is between 7 and 14 the state
must rebut the presumption of incapacity.
33. The infancy defense may be traced back to at least the time of Blackstone. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22-24. See generally JuJ'Nm
OFFENDERS FOR A TuousAND YEARS (W. Sanders ed. 1970). The first juvenile
court act came into existence in Illinois in 1899. See Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
34. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22.
35. See In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, - n.3, 256 A.2d 322, 327 n.3
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969), which held the infancy defense inapplicable to
juvenile court proceedings. See also In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d
127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970) (rebuttable presumption of infancy defense applicable to juvenile court proceedings).
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While this would define the presumptions when the juvenile's age
at commission of the offense coincides with his age at the time of
the proceedings, it would not resolve the allocation of presumptions when the ages do not coincide. Presumably a child under
seven at the time of the commission, that is, the child with the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity, could not be brought before
the juvenile court for that offense once he has passed the age of
seven. It would seem that he always could claim the irrebuttable
presumption of incapacity. The child between fourteen and sixteen who committed an offense while between seven and fourteen
may not always be in such a favored position. Whether he could
claim the rebuttable presumption of incapacity would depend on
whether the jurisdiction permits the age at commission or the age
at the time of the proceedings to control. 6 If the age at the time of
the proceedings governs, then he would not have claim to the rebuttable presumption of incapacity.
While the discussion concerning the application of the infancy
defense to juvenile court proceedings is hypothetical, the infancy
defense does result in a factual interaction between juvenile and
criminal court jurisdiction. For example, a statute that purports
to permit the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction to the criminal
court for all juveniles within its exclusive original jurisdiction is
limited in fact by the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity. If
the juvenile court does waive, the criminal court is without jurisdiction due to the presumption of incapacity. 3 7 Secondly, if the
juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction of children under sixteen
and the court uses the age at the time of commission of the offense to determine whether the juvenile or criminal court has jurisdiction, then setting the age for criminal incapacity, whether it
be irrebuttable or rebuttable, at an age below sixteen would be
futile. Since the criminal court would never see a defendant who
was charged with committing an offense while under sixteen,
the presumption could be claimed by no one. The infancy 38defense then becomes a relic of the pre-juvenile court era.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The concept of intent in fact relates to the proposition that juvenile court jurisdiction is being based on the commission of a crime.
36. Compare People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d
367 (1956) (age at commission) with People v. Carlson, 360 Mich. 651, 104
N.W.2d 753 (1960) (age when accused) and State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (age at the proceedings).

37. See Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the Juvenile Murderer, 1970
WASH. U.L.Q. 113, 118.

38. See id. at 126, 131.
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By charging delinquency based on a crime and deleting proof of
intent in fact, the courts have permitted the pleading of one
charge and the proving of another. If the concept of crime is so
detestable when discussing juveniles, then it, and not the concept
of intent in fact, should be eliminated as a concept in juvenile
court. Acts alone that may show anti-social conduct could be
used for juvenile court jurisdiction. Homicide, the killing of one
human being by another human being, could serve as an example.
A child who commits a homicide could be designated within the
juvenile court's jurisdiction. The mens rea element that would
normally differentiate between homicides (murder, manslaughter
or justifiable homicide) would be eliminated. The first question
for the court would be whether the child committed the homicide.
An affirmative answer would place the child within the court's
jurisdiction for disposition. The court would then receive evidence to determine "what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." By
eliminating the mens rea element from the definition of juvenile
court jurisdiction, the proof of the charge would be consistent
with the pleading and the original tenet of the juvenile court could
be revived.
This approach would be objectionable in that the child is labeled a delinquent regardless of whether the act was an accident. The relevancy of accident would be held for disposition.
Therefore intent in fact should be as much an element in the proof
of the case as are the actus reus elements. Care must be taken,
however, in selecting an offense where the intent can be proven.
Otherwise the jurisdiction of the juvenile court will be defeated.
Without jurisdiction, the court is powerless to help the child. The
problem is not as great as it would seem at first inspection. Since
the juvenile court, unlike the criminal court, should be unconcerned with degree of penalty, the most severe crime need not
be chosen. A lesser crime will give the juvenile court the same
jurisdiction over the child.
The juvenile court cannot and has not ignored the insane child.
The alternatives are not between ejecting the insane child out into
the street or casting off insanity as a defense. The alternatives
are in the techniques used to help the child. The techniques are
dictated by the various legislative structures. The most direct way
of permitting the juvenile court to aid the insane child is legislative extension of the court's jurisdiction beyond delinquency.
This avoids the need for the delinquency adjudication and permits
rapid commitment. The California statute is typical:
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Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any
of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a
dependent child of the court:
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because 3of9
a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
In those states that do not provide such an extension of juvenile
court jurisdiction,40 the courts have no choice but to work through
the delinquency adjudication. Three variations may be illustrated.
The first requires a delinquency petition to be filed as a prerequisite for the juvenile court to order a mental examination. After a hearing on the mental examination, the child may be comThe delinquency adjudication stage need not be
mitted.
reached. 41 The second requires a delinquency petition to be filed
and the court to hold an adjudication hearing. The court then
may find the child not a delinquent child by reason of insanity.
The child is then subject to a similar disposition as an adult who
has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. 42 The third
variation does not permit an adjudication of "not a delinquent
child by reason of insanity." These juvenile courts adjudicate
the child solely on the actus reus elements of the offense. This labels the child a delinquent. Once the adjudication of delinquency
has been made, the court has the power to consider the child's insanity and commit him to a mental institution.4 3 Thus, all methods consider insanity with similar results. The difference is technique.
The common law and statutes that provide the infancy defense
were conceived prior to the conception of the juvenile court.
While they interact with juvenile statutes, they lose their relevance
because of the existence of the juvenile court. Confidence that the
juvenile court is the appropriate forum for handling the juvenile
who has committed a crime and effective drafting of juvenile
court legislation will end the need for the infancy defense. This
requires exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction with age being based
on the age at the time of the commission of the offense.4 4
39. CAL. WEFL. & INST'NS CODE § 600(c) (West 1972).
40. For example, there is no statutory authority in New Jersey for commitment to a mental hospital except under the civil commitment procedure, unless
there has been an adjudication of delinquency. See In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super.
583, - n.5, 256 A.2d 322, 328 n.5 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969).
41. See In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
42. See State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).

43. See In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.
1969).
44. Exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction may be coupled with a waiver provision. The waiver should be from a group whose age at the time of commis-
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If the juvenile court lacks necessary support to terminate the
use of the infancy defense in criminal court, then the infancy
statute should be brought into the twentieth century. The typical
statute now provides that "a person under the age of seven years
is deemed incapable of committing a crime." While this was
sufficient when there was only a criminal court, the advent of the
juvenile court requires the statute to be changed to mean that a person under seven shall not be charged with the crime in criminal
court. The crime, however, may form the basis for a delinquency
petition in juvenile court. The elements of the crime are the
same as if the charge were brought in criminal court.
sion was above the age for the irrebuttable presumption. Whether it is above
the age for the rebuttable presumption is a policy decision. The jurisdictional
statute should be coupled with a transfer-back statute. The latter requires all
courts, other than the juvenile court, to transfer delinquency cases to the juvenile court. See STANDARD Juv. Cr. AcT § 9 (Nat'l Council on Crime & Del.
6th ed. 1959). Without an effective transfer-back statute, exclusive juvenile
court jurisdiction may become jurisdiction concurrent with that of the criminal
court.

